Identity, like many of the dimensions presented so far, is central to sociological research and the understanding of human beings. The self has often been described as a form of presentation or performance (Goffman, 1959), where the search for authenticity is a recurring theme in sociology (Taylor, 1991). Mead emphasizes how the self is an intertwined product of the interaction between the individual and society (1934). Giddens describes the self as more reflective, shaped by the individual’s active creation of meaning in a late, modern world (1991). Foucault viewed the self as decentralized, a product of structures and cultural practices rather than something innate, shaped through processes of subjectivation, but later came to see it as the result of the subject’s own care for itself (1977, 1980).
Genuine pretending: balancing various identity technologies that involve a certain degree of authenticity but also performativity to support the good life. Genuine pretending is the approach to our identity recommended by Moehller and Dámbriosa (2021). Genuine pretending is a balance between being genuine and pretending in our identity performativity. Instead of indulging in various forms of identity fundamentalism, where one strives to play one’s role as correctly as possible with the idea that identity is the focus, the work of identity has an overarching goal: the pursuit of the good life. Moehller and D’Ambrioso argue that there are three technologies for constructing an identity: authenticity, sincerity, and proficacy. Within a culture, these can be experienced by the subject as a form of compulsion, for example, a compulsion toward authenticity, to strive for a “true self” in order to access a core that is spontaneous and does not need to be performed. Genuine pretending involves using various identity technologies while always remaining aware that a certain degree of pretense (performativity) is inherent in them; this reduces the likelihood of falling into identity crises, such as an authenticity crisis in which we feel we are not authentic enough (Moehller & D’ambrioso, 2021). Performance can be achieved through irony as a tool for creating distance from roles, authenticity mandates, and demands for sincerity (Rorty, 1989). Rorty, however, goes too far in exalting irony, causing it to lose an important connection to the pursuit of sincerity, genuineness, and some form of claim to authenticity (Taylor, 1991; Trilling, 1972; Wallace, 1997). Genuine pretending is also linked to the fact that the self that appears genuine is always, at the same time, a product of the social context into which we are integrated (Mead, 1934); we cannot stand outside the social and find anything entirely genuine. This is thus linked to the fact that otherness is always part of a relational self, an otherness that contrasts with the self but cannot stand outside of it (Hegel in Taylor, 1975).
Charles Taylor has distinguished between the “buffered self,” which sees a clear distinction between the inner and the outer, between the psyche and the world, and the “porous self,” which lacks this division between the inner and the outer (Taylor, 2007). Taylor suggests that we live today in an age where the self has become buffered. This is contradicted by how many people experience their psyches as porous, influenced by society and their surroundings. Genuine pretending points toward a middle ground in Taylor’s dichotomy, a metaphor of the “membrane self”, which can both shut out and distinguish between the inner and the outer, yet remains porous enough to be influenced by what lies outside. It is a fact that we are influenced by the external world within us, for example through the “generalized other” (Mead, 1934) or the superego, or similar metaphors. The “membrane self” is a metaphor for becoming aware that there is a middle ground. It is also possible to create a shield against the outside world that cannot flow through us indiscriminately. The membrane can provide a certain stability and protection from the world, which, without it, could exert too much influence on the porous self. The membrane is both something solid, a form of authenticity, and a pretense designed to protect oneself from the demands of role, playing.
Genuine pretending can also be said to be linked to a decentralized self as a form of balance. The self is there, but it is not at the center; rather, it is part of a moral space that includes other people. This is closely related to the dimension of looking inward, and outward. The centered self, on the other hand, becomes too primary, leading to self, focus, narcissism, and “ego, dominated emotions,” which can cause one to miss out on feelings that go beyond the self, such as wonder (Haidt & Keltner, 2003), collective elation (Collins, 2004), mystical and ecstatic experiences (Critchley, 2024), and mindful presence in the moment (Paulsen, 2020). Decentering the self can be achieved through various practices such as rituals (alone and with others), yoga, mindfulness, and caring for others through action (Paulsen, 2020), where the aim is to shift one’s focus away from the self.
Cultivation, as a transformation of personality and character through learning and culture, has points of contact with genuine make, believe. Part of cultivation involves engaging with others’ perspectives, where we use our imagination, through books, for example, to pretend to be other people for a moment. Cultivation is thus a process by which otherness is incorporated into one’s own self through an open, minded exploration. This becomes embedded in one’s identity, so this imaginative role, playing shapes one’s identity. Education has been associated with authenticity, but this connection does not hold up. Genuine make, believe is a form of subjectified self, objectification. We possess a certain degree of consciousness and agency when we relate to our own identity with a sense of distance. I view genuine pretending as a socio, technological resource because it is a way to redirect our focus: instead of constructing and shaping our identity to perfection using various identity technologies, we can focus on becoming better people ethically, which is linked to actions. Through actions, the focus on the self and identity diminishes; these constructs are silenced.
The dualism of similarity and difference has been central to sociology and social theory, especially since the advent of poststructuralist theory and identity movements. In ABT, genuine pretending creates a balance in which similarities and differences do not become ends in themselves. Differences and similarities are means to a moral life. Over, heterogenization and over, homogenization are imbalances in which identity and one’s perception of reality are too strongly linked to similarities with certain people and differences from others. This imbalance is also linked to the fact that these imbalances often interact with an increased level of conflict (that is, too much dissensus outwardly and too much consensus inwardly).
Imbalances
Below are various imbalances in this dimension.
Excessive identity work
An excess of identity work occurs when identity work becomes an end in itself, disconnected from the good life. This has been termed “identity fundamentalism,” as identity becomes extremely important and must be done correctly and entirely authentically, regardless of which identity technology one chooses (Moehller & D’Ambriaso, 2021). The various identity technologies that people pursue with an excess of identity focus create different crises when the person feels they are not living up to the ideal of that identity technology: a crisis of authenticity, a crisis of sincerity, and a crisis of profility (Moehller & D’Ambriaso, 2021). This can occur when there is a conflict between a role one is expected to assume according to family and tradition and a role that feels authentic. It can also arise in an attempt to maintain a profile that is exhausting due to the effort required. Or an authenticity crisis may occur when one feels that they are different in various social contexts. What may begin as an open exploration of identity, which may even be anti, essentialist, can, with an excess of that effort, become reified and an end in itself. For example, a queer identity intended to destabilize a binary division and to be more authentic to one’s own experience can become a new, reified identity that comes with the expectation that one must behave in a certain way in order to view oneself, and be viewed by others, as queer or non, binary. Too much focus on and too much faith in “authentic” gender and gender expression create problems.
Sincerity also creates problems here
simply stepping into the role you’ve been assigned, man or woman, is what creates problems. The pursuit of success in matters of gender is something that creates many problems. It creates problems because certain groups place too much emphasis on gender as an expression and as an identity. It is something that is treated as a major part of identity, disconnected from a heroized citizenship. Identity fundamentalism linked to sex and gender could be called a “gender focus” and a “sex focus.” This sex focus, however, can be masked by having a taken, for, granted and normalized identity, even though this can also be highly sex, focused. For example, many male, to, male and female, to, female transformations are carried out (surgeries, makeup, working out to look more muscular and adopt gender, affirming physiques, shaving beards, etc.) that may go unnoticed and be regarded as completely normal. Often, these transformations are incorporated into other discourses, such as health discourses. Transformations of various kinds are part of being human, involving the adoption of roles, new configurations (Stryker, 1984), cyborghood (Haraway, 1985), transformations of one’s identity and appearance (Elliot & Lemert, 2009), and profiles (D’ambriaso & Moehller, 2021). Working on one’s identity, experiencing one’s identity, and having it affirmed carries an element of pleasure, but when the hedonism of transformations in identity work takes over, it becomes a problem, because then it hinders the pursuit of the good life.
Deficit of identity work
Reified/taken, for, granted identity
the identity one has is considered to be the “real” one and completely fixed. This is often supported by common sense, which can be combined with cherry, picking research, for example, relying solely on evolutionary psychology as a perspective. The reified identity can feel as though no effort is required to maintain it, because one feels “like a fish in water” and experiences no discrepancy between one’s habitus and one’s surroundings (Friedman, 2016). This can be challenged in times of change. The taken, for, granted identity can then become a reactionary and nostalgic identity (for example, reactionary or nostalgic masculinity/femininity). Instead, the taken, for, granted identity often becomes an excess of identity work in a symbolic political struggle.
Another imbalance could be that identity plays no role at all, a state of “a, identity.” Who I am does not matter at all. A lack of a sense of self that can result from rapid changes, where one cannot even manage to genuinely pretend within the various identity technologies but is only able to become locked into all forms.
The “Othered Self” (Hegel) / “Outsourced Self” (Hochschild, 2016) describes how individuals delegate emotional, practical, and identity, forming tasks to external actors, such as service providers or market actors. This means that functions that have traditionally been part of one’s self, identity, such as caregiving, relationships, and life choices, are externalized, which can affect how people experience their own autonomy and authenticity. Delegating these tasks reduces personal responsibility, but it can also create a sense that parts of one’s self are commercialized or fragmented. This can also occur through para, relationships, that is, strong relationships with celebrities or fictional characters in which their identity takes over one’s own. Identity is constructed by someone else, real or fictional, a process of othering.
Deficit of authenticity
Theatricalized
Asplund (1987) argues that in today’s society, we are often treated as representatives of a role in the transformations of our identity and appearance (Elliot & Lemert, 2009). There is too much focus on playing the role, on following what has been predetermined and established, which leaves no room for play, spontaneity, or creativity, and instead leads to a calculating mindset. Asplund argues that role, playing is the foundation of burnout, a modern phenomenon, because roles are so central when “genuine engagement” is not allowed to take place (Lindblom, 2023, 44).
Ironized
Illouz points to an overuse of irony in today’s culture, which, for example, affects dating, making it difficult for those involved to take it seriously (Illouz, 2022). “Ironized” is a state within the identity dimension that results in an excess of pretense and performance. “Irony poisoning” has been used as a term to describe situations where irony has been used so extensively and has penetrated so deeply that no form of authenticity or sincerity remains. It can become an escape from ever committing to any degree of genuineness, a form of cynicism and detachment. This stands in contrast to the sincerity of standing up for something and for who one is. Irony as a tool for identity can be part of genuine pretending, serving to create distance from various roles or from a moral culture that encourages authenticity. Žižek points out that irony can nevertheless bind one to what one is distancing oneself from, since irony can create a sense of satisfaction, one at least has distance from the job one hates, yet does it anyway, an enlightened false consciousness (Žižek, 1989; Sloterdijk, 1987). An excess of irony hinders the seriousness and attentiveness toward the other that are required for a genuine moral project (Weil, 2002). Foster Wallace has pointed out that the problem with irony is that it involves negativity and deconstruction but is not constructive; for that, sincerity is also required (1997).
Pseudo-authenticity
Taylor argues that the “age of authenticity” in which we live is not genuine authenticity, for it is too self, focused and disconnected from a moral, heroic horizon, and involves a failure to articulate the good life, or a one, sidedness in what is perceived as authentic (1991).
Role anxiety
Role anxiety is a concept that describes the inner conflict and uncertainty that arise when an individual both plays a social role and simultaneously doubts its authenticity or appropriateness. This can lead to a sense of alienation from oneself and distrust toward others. This is linked to affective dissonance (Hochschild, 2003).
Adapted
Norbert Elias has argued that we are in the midst of a “process of civilization” in which people are physically disciplined, making them less violent and less likely to lose bodily control (2000). Elias argues, however, that this process can sometimes reverse, as in the case of Nazism, which represents a regression of civilization. Sociologist Mestrovic argues that Elias overlooks an important aspect. Even though a person may appear on the surface to be more controlled and less brutal, this can be a façade, and an indifference to the suffering of others may lie beneath the surface, even beneath a facade of being very “pleasant,” cheerful, smiling, and even sympathetic. Mestrovic writes:
“Everyone knows that a person can have the most polished manners, never utter a hateful word in public, and exhibit refinement in his or her every movement, yet can secretly harbor the most cruel indifference to the suffering of others, the most hateful prejudices, and the most cleverly disguised brutality.”
Reisman and Mestrovic view “niceness” as something false and inauthentic:
“Being ‘nice’ is a fascinating emotion, a sort of hybrid between being polite but reserved toward strangers, a trait rooted in inward, directed days, and the stereotypically American habit of being superficially cordial yet also distant. Being nice is an intricate act that involves the manipulation of oneself and others in highly predictable and deliberate ways, including: one’s physical appearance, language, tone, eye contact, choice of clothing, smile, and the choice and length of conversation, among a myriad of other factors. The average middle, class child today knows the social formula for being ‘nice’ unconsciously, even if he or she could not necessarily list all the factors if asked. And everyone today knows the importance of “having to be nice to everybody” in every profession.¹³ Note that “niceness” is a synthetic, feigned, and ultimately insincere form of friendliness” (Reisman, in Mestrovic, 1996, 56).
Imbalance in Similarity/Difference
Over-heterogenization
This is an imbalance in which too much focus is placed on finding differences from other people in order to construct one’s identity. This is evident in discourses such as “men are from Mars and women are from Venus,” where differences between women and men are exaggerated through biologization, while the brain’s plasticity and similarities are underestimated. It can also result from overemphasizing one’s identity; for example, excessive heterogeneity arises when one strives too hard for authenticity or sincerity.
Abjectified
Becoming an abject in terms of identity involves falling outside what society or a community defines as acceptable and human. The concept, developed primarily by Kristeva (1982), describes a feeling of being rejected or cast out, often because one challenges or threatens the boundaries of social norms and identity categories. This means that the individual is not fully recognized as part of the community or the “we” category and becomes something “other”, both repulsive and indefinable. This can create a paradoxical position in which one is simultaneously part of and excluded from the social order, which affects self, perception and a sense of belonging.
Over-homogenization
This is an imbalance in which too much focus is placed on the similarities one shares with certain groups. It may involve overlooking cultural differences that could affect how an overarching democratic culture is maintained (Putnam, 1993). Alternatively, it can involve completely erasing the differences between men and women regardless of context, thereby underestimating hormonal differences, this can result, for example, in women not being compensated for having to take more sick days due to their menstrual cycle. However, this must be put into context: in Sweden, the primary cause of differences in health outcomes for women stems from the double burden of work, and female, dominated professions, such as healthcare, are highly stressful. Another example of over, homogenization is completely neglecting differences in brain function, where, for example, someone with dyslexia does not receive adequate support.
Over-homogenization and over-heterogenization often occur in tandem, reinforcing one another. These imbalances, in turn, are linked to either striving too hard for authenticity, which creates these imbalances by leading people to see themselves as very different from others and similar to certain others, or to a more strategic approach to building a profile that positions oneself in a certain way to gain advantages, which is then linked to a Machiavellian tendency to exploit identity for personal gain. It can also be a more strategic approach to building a profile, presenting oneself in a certain way to gain advantages, which is then linked to a Machiavellian tendency to exploit identity for specific purposes.